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1
Reason, Reasons and Normativity
Joseph Raz

All normative phenomena are normative in as much as, and because, they
provide reasons or are partly constituted by reasons. This makes the concept
of a reason key to an understanding of normativity. Believing that, I will
here present some thoughts about the connection between reasons and
Reason and between Reason and normativity.

1. REASONS AND REASON
Why are the facts which constitute reasons reasons? What about those
facts makes them reasons? As expected the answer is that there is an
inherent relation between reasons and Reason—understood as our rational
faculties or abilities. But what is it? Think of it this way (and I will
focus here on practical reasons): that I am hungry is a reason to eat. But
what has Reason to do with it? Would I not eat, if hungry and if food
were available, anyway? Do not animals of species which do not possess
Reason eat when hungry? If reasons do not call for Reason why are they
reasons?
The facts that are reasons are reasons because they are part of the case
for a certain response, for a belief or an action, or an emotion. The
example of hunger shows that there can be, and sometimes there are,
capacities and processes which reliably lead to appropriate responses to
reasons, without the mediation of rational powers. Nor are these absent
Earlier versions of the paper were presented at a workshop at Leeds, at the BSET annual
conference of 2006, at CUNY’s Graduate Center in the same year, as well as at a seminar
conducted by Christine Korsgaard at Harvard in 2007, and at a conference in Santa
Barbara in 2008. I am grateful to participants on those occasions for their comments and
responses.
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in humans.¹ So why are reasons reasons if there are processes which align
us with them independently of our rational powers? We cannot claim that
in all domains reliance on rational capacities is better at bringing us into
conformity with reasons than other processes. Often the automatic, Reasonbypassing processes are best. Though there need be no rivalry between
them, and often rational capacities regularly interact with Reason-bypassing
processes.
Of course, some reasons can neither be brought into existence nor
recognised except through the use of Reason. This is the case with most
reasons which are cultural creations. But even in their case, the explanation
why they invite certain responses need not invoke that fact. For example,
some epistemic reasons which can only be recognised as reasons by rational
creatures can nevertheless be identified as facts calling for belief, because they
are evidence for the truth of that belief, and their standing as evidence can be
explained without invoking the way that they are identified.
So why are they reasons? Because Reason is our general capacity to
recognise and respond to reasons. There are other capacities which also do
that. But Reason is the universal capacity to recognise reasons, one which
in principle enables us to recognise any reason which applies to us, and
to respond to it appropriately. A little later I will say more about the way
Reason enables us to recognise reasons. In particular that it enables people
reflectively to recognise that the facts that are reasons are reasons. Here I will
add just one observation: that Reason is a capacity reflectively to recognise
reasons does not entail that every exercise of reason involves reflection,
reasoning or deliberation. With experience we learn to identify and respond
to reasons instinctively, though in ways which depend on and presuppose
first, reliance on past reflection, and second, the monitoring presence of
rational powers which control and stand ready to correct misidentifications
or misdirected responses.
Even so the statement that Reason is the general capacity reflectively to
recognise and respond to reasons may appear formal and uninformative.
Is not saying that Reason is the universal capacity to identify and respond
to reasons like saying that we dream dreams? Since ‘dreams’ are defined
as the objects of dreaming, saying that we dream dreams is a mere formal
statement. But the analogy with Reason and reasons ignores the normative
¹ The point is probably limited to practical reasons and reasons for emotions, and does not
apply to epistemic ones. The reason is conceptual: ACTION is a generic concept, covering
acting for reasons, as well as other actions, whereas BELIEF is the specific concept which
marks one of various broadly cognitive states which essentially involve our rational capacities,
being essentially responsive to reasons (not necessarily in being generated by the realisation
that there are reasons for them, but rather in being modified upon awareness that there are
sufficient reasons against them), as some of the others, like guesses and hunches, are not.
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aspect of the relations between them. Reason can malfunction. Therefore,
reasons cannot be defined as what Reason recognises and responds to.
As Reason may fail there are criteria by which success and failure are
determined, and they determine what reasons there are to be recognised.
In conclusion we can say that Reason does not make reasons into reasons
(Reason is not a source of reasons). But they are reasons because rational
creatures can recognise and respond to them with the use of Reason.
Needless to say, there are features of the world that we respond to, where
the response cannot be secured via using our rational powers. Such responses
are involuntary, and the triggering features are classified as stimuli. Because
the response cannot be secured by our rational powers, that is because it
cannot be guided reflectively, those stimuli are not reasons, even if the
response is sensible, beneficial, etc. To be a reason a fact must be one that
we can respond to using our rational powers, whether or not on any specific
occasion that is how we do respond to it.
Being the general reflective capacity to recognise reasons distinguishes
Reason from other processes like hunger, or the instinctive avoidance of
fire, which recognise some specific kinds of reasons.

2. REASON AND REASONING
The thesis that Reason is the power to recognise reasons will be finessed
and somewhat modified in Section 3. First, I will relate it to the more
common view that Reason is the power of reasoning. Paul Grice combines
both views:
No less intuitive than the idea of thinking of reason as the faculty which equips
us to recognize and operate with reasons is the idea of thinking of it as the faculty
which empowers us to engage in reasoning.²

Grice thought that the two ideas harmonise. He proceeds to explain:
Indeed if reasoning should be characterisable as the occurrence or production of a
chain of inferences, and if such chains consist in (sequentially) arriving at conclusions
which are derivable from some initial set of premises, and for the acceptance of
which, therefore, these premises are, or are thought to be, reasons, the connection
between these two ideas is not accidental.³

I will basically follow Grice, though my understanding of the way the
two ideas harmonise is somewhat different from his. Reasoning is Reason’s
main way of recognising reasons. But Reason includes more than the power
² Paul Grice, Aspects of Reason (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 5.

³ Ibid.
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to reason, and since not all reasoning aims at identifying or operating
with reasons the relationship of Reason and the power to reason is more
complicated than may at first appear.
I have already noted that some mental activities which depend on past
reasoning are manifestations of our rational powers even though they do
not involve present reasoning, and that activities guided and monitored by
Reason in the background are also manifestations of rational powers not
involving reasoning. But there is much more.
Sometimes it is irrational for people to fail to engage in reasoning, as
when they have an overriding reason to reason, and are in a position
to know that. Such irrationalities are non-derivative. Even when, as is
only sometimes the case, failure to deliberate is a result of a decision, the
irrationality of failure to deliberate does not depend on such prior decisions,
and does not derive from their irrationality. Likewise, sometimes the very
activity of reasoning, even when one is reasoning flawlessly, is irrational.
There may be conclusive reasons, which are known or should be known,⁴
not to reason, thus rendering one’s reasoning irrational. One can also be
non-derivatively irrational in continuing deliberation for too long, failing to
come to a conclusion. Besides, weak-willed intentions show that intentions
can be non-derivatively irrational. They are intentions one forms against
one’s own better judgement. It follows that the irrationality of a weak-willed
intention does not derive from failure to reason correctly.
These considerations suggest that Reason consists of more than the
power of reasoning, and includes at least the power to form intentions and
decisions. Two considerations support this view. First, reasoning being an
intentional activity, the power to form intentions and decisions is intimately
involved in it, and given that their faulty use can render the whole activity
of reasoning on a particular occasion irrational there is a case for counting
the power to form intentions and decisions among our rational powers.
Secondly, and more generally, I have been implicitly relying on a test which
I will call the irrationality test. It says that if the exercise of a capacity can
be non-derivatively irrational (that is irrational not because something else
is irrational) then the capacity is one of our rational powers. I will further
consider the test in the next section.
Still, the ability to reason is at the core of our rational capacities. How
so? Some, like Harman, think that reasoning ‘is a process of modifying
antecedent beliefs and intentions’.⁵ But that should not be taken to provide
⁴ Or at least one should accept the proposition that there are such reasons and behave
accordingly.
⁵ ‘Practical Reasoning’, in Reasoning, Meaning and Mind (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 46. His
later paper ‘Rationality’ (ibid.) allows for reasoning which does not change judgement.
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a test for identifying reasoning. It is doubtful whether reasoning has to
lead to modification of belief or intention. I may, for example, examine
one of my beliefs, and, not having new information, I consider again the
considerations I considered before and do not find grounds to change my
mind.⁶ My reflections seem a straightforward case of reasoning, but they
need not involve a change of belief or intention. There are other cases in
which one reasons without changing beliefs or intentions. The reasoning
may have been tentative, not reaching any final conclusions.
In such cases the reasoning, though not leading to their change, is
undertaken in order to examine the case for a modification of one’s beliefs
or intentions. This is commonly the case, but it need not be. One may
indulge in reasoning in order to pass the time. One may playfully examine
hypotheses and their consequences, doing so as a game, a pastime, possibly
doing so carelessly, off-handedly. It does not matter. Nor does it matter if
one’s reasoning is affected by wishful thinking. One would not change one’s
views as a result, for one does not take the activity, the reasoning, seriously.
It is just an amusing pastime. One is not irrational on such occasions, even
though the reasoning is faulty, and may display a propensity to commit
fallacies, which may give grounds to believe that one would be irrational
when reasoning ‘seriously’.
Bad reasoning, I conclude, is⁷ irrational when and because one nonaccidentally fails to respond appropriately to reasons, and the failure is, is
due to, a failure or malfunction of one’s rational powers. When one has
reasons to form beliefs or to consider the merits of beliefs or actions, then if
one does so irresponsibly, carelessly or negligently, or if one’s reasoning is
affected by motives which should not affect it, that is if one is guilty of one
or another form of motivated irrationality, and if these failures are due to
an entrenched disposition to fail in that way, which afflicts one’s rational
powers, then one is failing to respond properly to those reasons in a way
which renders one’s flawed reasoning irrational. Motivated irrationality is a
form of belief-formation contrary to reason and so is negligent reasoning.
Negligence is not merely carelessness. It is carelessness (for which we
are responsible) when we have reason to be careful. We can only reason
negligently when we have reason to form beliefs or seriously to consider the
merits of beliefs or of actions. The examples support the conclusion that
⁶ Nor need such cases yield a belief that the beliefs or intentions one examined need no
revision, at least it need not yield a belief to that effect different from the one one had before.
It depends how much one trusts the reasoning just concluded.
⁷ Perhaps I should say ‘deserves’ to be regarded as irrational—one may well claim that the
boundaries of the concept of ‘irrationality’ are vague on this point. It is the theoretical account
of Reason which ultimately drives this view. So at most one can claim that it is not at odds
with firm features of usage.
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mere bad reasoning does not constitute irrationality. I will return to the
point below.⁸
This leads to the main point: while not all reasoning aims at identifying
and operating with reasons, the power of reasoning is essentially a power
whose purpose is to identify and respond to reasons. Reasoning is an
intentional mental activity, and a norm-guided activity in that it is governed
by criteria of correctness. This is true of both ‘serious’ and ‘non-serious’
reasoning. Reasoning playfully is reasoning governed by the same norms,
and mistakes remain mistakes (though their commission does not show that
we act irrationally).
The norms of correct reasoning show that the point of reasoning is to
enable us to detect and respond to reasons. The constitutive standards of
reasoning determine both what is reasoning and what is successful reasoning.
Reasoning is an activity which is held responsible to those standards, an
activity whose success is judged by them.⁹ They determine the success of
reasoning as a generic activity, though the actual reasoning one engages in
on this occasion or that may be undertaken for some other purpose, and
may be successful—though not as reasoning—for some other reason even
when flawed as a piece of reasoning.
This, then, is the difference between ‘serious’ and ‘non-serious’ reasoning.
Serious reasoning is meant to serve its point, and, therefore, to be successful
according to its constitutive standards. Non-serious reasoning is the use of
the same capacity, performing an activity of the same type, but detached
from its normal purpose. The activity is still held responsible to its
constitutive standards, but the reason which led to engaging in it may be
served regardless of its success as reasoning. So non-serious reasoning is a
marginal case of reasoning. It is understood and is broadly conducted as
serious reasoning, but, as it is detached from its point, failure to conform to
the norms governing the activity is not necessarily, on that occasion, a fault.
Reasoning’s constitutive standards are ones which ensure that, when
followed, the conclusion of the reasoning is warranted, namely one which
⁸ Note that there are two kinds of mistake in reasoning which do not render it irrational. In
the text I focus on one of them, i.e. when one is not reasoning ‘seriously’, one is not reasoning
in response to a perceived adequate reason to reason. The other is when the mistake is due to a
lapse of either memory, attention, or another of one’s ancillary powers, which are not among
the rational powers, or to an occasional rather than entrenched malfunction of one’s rational
powers.
⁹ This gives rise to the question: when is an activity governed by those standards? I will
not consider this issue here. It seems reasonable to suppose that it is so when either the person
engaging in the activity is one who has the capacity to reason and takes himself to be so
governed, namely accepts the legitimacy of judging his activity by those standards, or if that
person behaves in a way which is reasonably understood as presenting himself to others as
someone who is reasoning. But much more needs to be said.
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we have adequate reason (though not always a conclusive reason) to accept.
Directly they warrant belief, indirectly they warrant actions, emotions and
other reason-sensitive attitudes. To be more accurate we need to take note of
the fact that in most instances of reasoning one relies on some propositions
whose credentials are not examined during that reasoning episode. Hence
successful reasoning assures reasoners that the conclusion is warranted, on
the assumption that so are the unexamined propositions relied upon. Its
purpose is to establish that given that assumption, certain beliefs, intentions,
and the like are warranted.
The norms of correct reasoning determine the point of reasoning, and
since the norms of correct reasoning are norms that warrant acceptance of
the conclusion of a correct reasoning the purpose that they serve is to guide
us in judging which beliefs and intentions we have reason to have. This
establishes the connection between Reason as the capacity to respond to
reasons, and reasoning.

3. THE SCOPE OF REASON
Characterising Reason as the general reflective capacity to recognise reasons
raises the question of which mental capacities belong with it, which belong
with our rational powers? I will say little on the subject. It is not my aim
to suggest criteria capable of adjudicating various borderline cases, either
between animal species which typically have Reason and those which do
not, or regarding the boundaries within a species between those who have
Reason and those lacking it. The fate of borderline cases may well depend on
additional considerations not canvassed here. But a few further observations
on the core concept, relying on our general knowledge of it in a way which
ties it to the account here proposed, may be helpful.
Various connections between Reason and other concepts can be called
upon in clarifying the concept. One is between Reason and personhood:
only persons have Reason. A second is between Reason and accountability,
which marks one sense of responsibility. Creatures that do not have rational
powers are not responsible (accountable) for their actions.¹⁰ And a third
is with the notion of irrationality. It led to the irrationality test suggested
above.
The irrationality test suggests demarcations of Reason which are not
dictated by its characterisation as a general power to recognise and operate
¹⁰ This does not mean that we are only responsible for or accountable for the exercise of
our rational powers. See my ‘Responsibility & the Negligence Standard’, Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 30(1) (2010), 1.
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with reasons. Decline in some mental capacities like the powers of memory
and of concentration affects one’s ability to detect and respond to reasons.
But we do not stop being persons simply because of loss of memory and
of concentration (at least not while we retain them to a minimal degree).
Hence these powers do not belong with our rational powers. But if so,
given that our success in recognizing reasons depends on our powers of
concentration and memory, can Reason be identified with the reflective
power to recognize reasons? This identification of Reason is correct, so long
as it is understood to represent the core of the concept of Reason, and is
not expected to set its limits.
The irrationality test is one of a number which offer more help with
marking the limits of our rational powers. It too suggests that memory and
the power of concentration are not among them because failures of memory
and concentration, however bad, are not irrational. They are among many
mental capacities which are ancillary to our rational powers, enabling them
to function well. Some provide the input on which the rational capacities
rely through perception, sensations (including those which are accompanied
by drives: like hunger, thirst, discomfort at the surrounding temperature,
sexual arousal, and more), or memory.
By the irrationality test the powers of reflection, deliberation and decision
are rational capacities. Interestingly the irrationality test suggests that the
capacity to have emotions is among our rational capacities because emotions
can be non-derivatively irrational.
The test relies on a distinction between derivative and non-derivative
irrationality. Something is derivatively irrational if it is irrational only if and
because something else is irrational. For example, actions are irrational only
if and because the intentions or decisions which render them intentional
are irrational.¹¹ Cases of non-derivative irrationality are cases where the
irrationality of what is irrational does not logically or conceptually depend
on nor is it due to some other irrationality. If a flawed exercise of a capacity
can only be derivatively irrational that capacity is not part of Reason. If,
on the other hand, a flawed exercise of a capacity can be non-derivatively
irrational then that capacity belongs with our rational capacities, is part of
our Reason.
Arguably emotions can be irrational because they are founded on
irrational beliefs. Fear based on an irrational belief that the shadow
on the wall is the devil about to kill one is an irrational fear. But
emotions can be irrational when they are disproportionate reactions to
rational beliefs. In such cases their irrationality is non-derivative, and
¹¹ One interesting result is that only intentional actions can be irrational, and not even all
of them, since not all intentional actions are actions undertaken with an intention.
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therefore by the irrationality test, emotional capacity is part of our rational
powers.
This conclusion will not surprise some, while seeming preposterous
to others, who will take it as a reason to reject the irrationality test.
There is, however, an independent case for including the capacity to have
emotions among the rational powers. For example, empathy is crucial for
understanding other people, as well as animals of other species, and arguably
emotional responses are essential to our ability to understand that we have
reasons of certain kinds, and to the ability to understand¹² what response
to various reasons is appropriate, as well as to motivate us to respond as we
should. There are also separate reasons for confidence in the irrationality
test. It seems natural to think that only failures of the power of Reason
could be irrational, except when the irrationality is derivative, that is, when
it derives from failure of powers of Reason. However, these matters require
a more detailed exploration of the role of the emotions in our make-up as
persons, in our motivations, and in our cognitive powers.
There is one important clarification, indeed modification, of the slogan
that Reason is the general reflective capacity to recognise reasons. The
slogan may give an unduly passive image of rational powers, just tabling
reports, as it were, of what reasons are to be found where. The slogan
should be augmented to say that Reason is the general capacity to recognise
and respond to reasons. Clearly that is so regarding theoretical reasons:
recognising a sufficient case for a belief is adopting the belief. There is
no separate step involved, no transition which, pathological cases apart,¹³
can fail. Properly recognising epistemic reasons is properly responding to
them.
Things are somewhat different when it comes to practical reasons
(including reasons for mental acts). Action may require interventions in
the world, regarding whose success agents have less control than over the
response to epistemic reasons or to reasons for mental acts, intentions, and
omissions (on most occasions). Except for the capacity to reason, decide,
form intentions and a few other capacities essential to be able to act with
intention which are part of our rational powers according to the irrationality
test, the capacity to act is not part of our rational capacities. This has to be
borne in mind in interpreting the extended slogan.¹⁴
¹² We can learn of those reasons, and of the response they make appropriate, from
testimony or other indirect means. But arguably we can understand them only because we
have emotional capacity ourselves.
¹³ Psychological phenomena are ‘pathological’ when they meet some of the criteria
determining their attribution (or existence), while failing others.
¹⁴ A capacity to act, while not part of the rational capacities, is an essential part of the
wider group which constitute the capacity for rational agency. They are pivotal in determining
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Nevertheless the extended slogan, properly understood, is correct. For
even regarding practical reasons, rational capacities must involve response
to them if they are to involve recognising them. People who recognise a
conclusive reason to  (to eat, or whatever) and who fail to respond to
it at all, fail (when the time comes) to form an intention to , have no
positive attitude at all towards -ing, do not respond appropriately to other
people -ing, etc., are non-derivatively irrational. Thus, the irrationality
test shows that capacity properly to respond to reason is part of our rational
capacities.
Furthermore, people who fail to respond appropriately in any way at all
do not fully recognise the existence of the reasons. Attribution of belief
depends on the existence of a variety of criteria of belief, and they include
not only avowing the belief, and attesting to reasons for it, etc., but also
responding to it appropriately: those who would not put an apple on a
table (assuming normal circumstances), for fear that the apple may fall to
the floor, show themselves not to believe that there is a table there. At best
theirs is a pathological case of belief. Hence recognising reasons involves
responding to them, and the mental capacities involved in setting ourselves
to respond, the powers of decision and intention, are part of our rational
powers.

4. IRRATIONALIT Y
Reason, i.e. the rational powers or capacities, is involved in activities
such as choosing, deciding, reasoning. These activities, and therefore
their results,¹⁵ are rational so long as the rational powers guiding them
function properly. They are irrational when these powers malfunction. It
is possible, by accident, for the result to be a happy one, that is the person
concerned may accidentally choose or decide as reason directs. But when
the result is the outcome of a malfunctioning rational power it is happy but
irrational.
This line of thinking allows for a distinction between mistakes (in
reasoning, choosing, etc.) which render the activity irrational, and those
which do not. The latter are due to malfunctioning of powers relied on
in these activities which are not among the rational powers. For example,
responsibility. See ‘Responsibility & the Negligence Standard’. And ‘Being in the World’
(forthcoming), ‘Agents and their Actions’, special issue of Ratio.
¹⁵ Using the term in the technical sense given it by von Wright (Norm and Action (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963)) i.e. as the state which defines the completion of the process
or activity.
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they may be due to lapses of memory, failures of attention, or failure of
perception, etc. Possibly, the account has to be modified somewhat to
allow for additional kinds of mistakes which do not render the activities
irrational. (For example, cases where the malfunction is accidental may not
render the activity and its outcome irrational. Arguably, they are irrational
only if due to a persistent condition.) I will not examine that possibility
here.
This view of rationality—the view that we are rational so long as we are
properly guided by well-functioning rational powers—has been followed
by various writers, e.g. Michael Bratman. Others, e.g. John Broome, have
taken a different view: according to them rationality relates to the occurrence
or non-occurrence of certain relations between mental states. For example,
and to simplify, our beliefs are irrational if they are contradictory.¹⁶ By
way of abbreviation I will call the first view dynamic and the second
static.
How do the two views relate to each other? They would be in harmony if
it turns out that they coincide in their judgements about the rationality of
beliefs, intentions, emotions, etc. But they do not. We may reach conditions
condemned as irrational by the static view by reasoning as we must according
to the dynamic view. For example, there may be overwhelming evidence
for a certain proposition and once aware of that I believe that proposition.
I have no choice, and I am dynamically rational. But it is possible that I
am also aware that the proposition contradicts some of my other beliefs. I
am therefore aware that either this or some other of my beliefs are false,
but I dynamically-rationally think that the fault is in the others. I do
not know which of the others is the guilty one. I only know that the
proposition concerned contradicts one or another of my other beliefs. Nor
do I know how to improve my other beliefs (one of them is false, but it may
approximate the truth). This may occur in conditions in which it would
be dynamically irrational for me to abandon any of my current beliefs, but
dynamically irrational not to add to them a belief which, as I know, is
inconsistent with them.
If situations like this are possible then the two approaches to rationality
conflict. They also conflict because one can satisfy the static conception
without satisfying the dynamic conception (e.g. via a string of mindless
accidents).¹⁷ It is possible to say that there is no conflict for these are
not two rival accounts of rationality. Rather they are explanations of
two different concepts of rationality. I cannot examine this possibility
¹⁶ Broome lists a number of more carefully formulated relations between mental states
whose occurrence renders them irrational.
¹⁷ A point made to me by Niko Kolodny, whose letter to me I am here quoting.
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here, so let me simply record that I suspect it to be mistaken, i.e. I
suspect that the two accounts do conflict, and that at least one of them is
mistaken.

5. NORMATIVIT Y AND PERSONHOOD
Finally, I turn from the relations between Reason and reasons, to the
relations between Reason and normativity. First, I will reject two tendencies
sometimes found in discussions of normativity. One is to identify it
with an orientation towards value, the other with the demands of rationality. I will suggest that the value of a thing provides some reasons, but
not all, and in any case does not explain the force of reasons. I will
also suggest that there is no reason, and no need for a reason, to be
rational.¹⁸
The difference between practical and epistemic reasons is central to the
attempt to understand the normativity of reasons. It defeats any attempt
to explain normativity as having to do with the influence of value on
us. Epistemic reasons have nothing to do with value. One way to persist
with the view that normativity is tied to value is to claim that reasons for
belief are only conditionally normative, which means that they are only
conditionally reasons. They are reasons when it is good to have that belief,
but not otherwise. Epistemic reasons help towards having true beliefs, and
this matters only when there is a reason to have them. Epistemic reasons
are a type of instrumental practical reasons.
This view flies in the face of the fact that all judgements which go with
reasons apply to epistemic reasons unconditionally. To mention but one:
we are not irrational for failing to conform to a conditional reason until
the condition is met. But it is irrational not to have the beliefs one has
adequate reason for whether or not the condition obtains, that is whether
or not there is value in having them.
Next, a few words about Rationality and normativity. First: neither the
question of the hold epistemic reasons have on us nor the question of their
normativity is the question ‘why be rational?’ We can fail to conform to
reasons which apply to us and still be rational. That would be the case so
long as our failure is not due to a malfunction of our rational powers, for
example, so long as our failure is due to non-culpable (e.g. non-negligent)
mistakes and ignorance. There is no normative standing to being rational
as such. There is no reason to be in a state in which one failed to identify
¹⁸ I have argued for this point at greater length in ‘The Myth of Instrumental Rationality’,
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 1(1)(2005), <www.jesp.org>.

Reason, Reasons and Normativity

17

reasons through a non-culpable mistake, even though the failure is not a
failure of rationality.¹⁹
There are two common mistakes which may be responsible for some
writers’ focusing on reasons to be rational. First, they fail to notice
that we need no reasons to function rationally, just as we need no
reason to hear sounds in our vicinity. So long as we are conscious our
powers of hearing and our rational powers are engaged, though not always
successfully.²⁰
Second , as I have noted above, some writers confuse conformity to
some logical principles with being rational. Most commonly avoiding
contradictions is mistakenly said to be a condition of rationality. To be
sure those who have contradictory beliefs have some false beliefs, but that
does not show that they are irrational, or that they ever did something
irrationally. One can come to endorse a set of contradictory beliefs without
ever committing an irrationality.
The quest for an explanation of normativity is not the question ‘why be
rational?’, and neither is it the question of the reasons for conforming with
reasons. Such reasons do not explain the hold reasons have on us, as these
supporting reasons need as much explanation as the supported reasons.
There is, of course, another question: what is the point, one may ask,
of being successfully rational, of functioning rationally well? The point is
obvious: it is a way of identifying and responding to reasons. There can, of
course, be non-standard reasons for functioning rationally well, or badly.
One can bet that one will not fail or that one will fail to function rationally
and so on. Such bets then provide (practical) reasons to try to do what it
takes to win them. Clearly the question of normativity is not about the
existence of such occasional reasons.
These preliminaries illustrate the difficulty in locating the question we are
after. Perhaps the following illustrates the difficulty: suppose one defies an
¹⁹ Of course we do not commend a person for failing non-negligently to identify reasons
which apply to him, and therefore we do not say to him ‘you were very rational in what you
did’. But that is a point about the implications of what we say. At other times we may say so:
‘Oh, I have become totally irrational’ he exclaims in despair, and we reassure him: ‘You are
perfectly rational, you just made a mistake.’
²⁰ In a comment on an earlier version Kolodny explains the point better than I did: ‘True,
my believing that 2+2=4, knowing what I know, is not (i) under my voluntary control.
Nevertheless, my believing it can be (ii) the direct upshot of deliberation, of reflection on
reasons (and this amounts to a kind of control over my beliefs, . . . ). By contrast, not even
the latter is true of the functioning of my rational powers as a whole. There is no question of
deliberating, ‘‘Shall I function rationally?’’ and then directly proceeding, on the basis of an
affirmative or negative answer, to continue functioning rationally, or to cease to. I could not
follow such a reason, in the sense Raz emphasizes in ‘‘Reasons: Practical and Adaptive’’ (in
D. Sobel & S. Wall, Reasons for Action, (CUP 2009) 37).’
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epistemic reason, what is wrong with that? The answers seem to be internal
to the concepts involved: we say—if you defy reason you are irrational.
So what? Your beliefs are incoherent—well suppose they are, what of it?
And so on. The temptation to say: ‘if you disregard reasons you will fall
down and break you neck’, or point to some other adverse practical result,
is overwhelming. And as we saw has to be resisted.
We, some of us, want to step outside the conceptual web, and find an
explanation for the hold that reasons have on us. This we can do since their
hold on us depends on the fact that responsiveness to reasons is constitutive
of personhood.
I should immediately make clear that I do not share the thought of some
philosophers that a constitutive account of reasons will settle what reasons
there are. Thinking of practical reasons, Korsgaard, e.g. claims that ‘Action
is self-constitution and accordingly, . . . what makes actions good or bad is
how well they constitute you.’²¹ She suggests that all practical reasons can
be derived from this insight: we have a standard of being a good person, and
you have reasons for actions which will constitute you as one, or something
which includes this idea. My constitutive account of rationality can yield
no such results. It is a mere formal account, and we will have to consider
whether such a formal account is, even if true, of any significance.²²
Here is the formal constitutive story: reasoning and deliberation are
mental activities which we can decide on. There are practical reasons for or
against reasoning and deliberating. But we cannot decide how to respond
to epistemic reasons. It is constitutive of belief that it is governed by our
responsiveness to epistemic reasons, governed gaplessly, automatically as it
were. Responsiveness to epistemic reasons is constitutive of believing.
Responsiveness to reasons can, of course, fail: through mistakes, fallacies,
wishful thinking, self-deception and more. How then are these standards
constitutive of belief? Does not failure establish that conformity to reason
is only contingently related to belief?
Conformity to reason is indeed contingent. What is essential to belief
is, first, its subjection to the normativity of reasons, its being subject
to evaluation as warranted or unwarranted depending on its conformity
with reasons; and, second , the fact that it is automatically, as it were,
self-correcting. Failures to conform to reasons are self-correcting when we
become aware of them. Again, no gap exists, no decision to correct is
required, no involvement of the will.
²¹ C. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Action, Identity and Integrity (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 25.
²² This makes it immune to the criticism of constitutive accounts advanced by David
Enoch in ‘Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What is Constitutive of
Agency’, Philosophical Review 115 (2006), 169–98.
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That is why the responsiveness to epistemic reasons is a form of constitutive normativity, normativity built into the very possibility of belief.²³
Not all our mental states are responsive to reasons. I may think that I am
a feathered bird, and not respond at all to evidence that I have no feathers
nor beak, etc. But then that kind of thinking is fantasising, imagining,
day-dreaming or the like; not believing.
There are two lessons here: first that we recognise the difference ourselves.
We know the difference between belief and imagination, and we know that
it consists in part in that belief is, while imagination is not, subject to the
full discipline of reasons (though imagination may be partially subject to it,
in a variety of different ways). I say that we know that, meaning not that
we would, or even could, articulate what we know in these terms. We may
not be that reflective, we may have false philosophical beliefs, or we may
lack the concepts I am using. What I mean is that the statement I made
correctly describes what we know, regardless of whether or not we are aware
of this.
The second lesson is that our control over belief differs from our control
over various forms of imagination. Regarding the imagination control
consists entirely of voluntary control. It depends on the degree to which we
can imagine at will. Not so with belief.
We cannot always imagine things at will, and when we do we cannot
always make ourselves stop imagining at will, and, most noticeably, even
when we imagine something at will our voluntary control over the details
of the imagining is very limited. In all these respects our voluntary control
over belief is generally similar (we can decide what to deliberate about, have
some ability to remember, i.e. to recall, at will, can often decide to stop
considering a matter, and so on). But distinctively, we have little voluntary
control over the way our beliefs respond to reasons we think we have. We
also have limited voluntary control over whether to have beliefs. We can
shut our eyes, but when open we cannot just refuse to believe what we see
²³ Naturally, the full story is much more complex. One point in particular is crucial for the
coherence of my account: some conditions of rationality, i.e. some conditions of responsiveness
to epistemic reasons, are universally constitutive of belief, so that there is no (non-pathological)
belief which does not conform to them. Some of these apply when agents are aware of their
application. An example of these may be the condition that one cannot, in full awareness of the
fact, believe a proposition and its negation (though one can oscillate between them, or display
other pathologies). We are sensitive to some conditions of rationality even when we are not
aware of them as conditions of rationality, in that they tend to increase the degree to which
we hold beliefs only if warranted through consciousness-bypassing processes. But generally,
firm belief that something is a condition of rationality (whichever way it is conceived, i.e. even
if one is not aware of it under this description) will have a more direct effect on our belief
formation. That enables us to improve our understanding of rationality, and of the conditions
of rationality, and thereby improve the processes by which we form and maintain beliefs.
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(whatever we say) without believing that we have some reason to doubt
what we see.
What is important is that the limits of our voluntary control over our
beliefs are not the limits of our control over them: we are in control over our
beliefs by functioning properly as rational agents, that is, we are in control,
and active, so long as, and to the degree that, our beliefs are governed by
Reason, by our rational powers.²⁴ That is what makes us persons. Roughly
speaking we are persons as long as we have rational capacities, and by and
large our beliefs and actions are governed by them, which is the same as
saying so long as we have beliefs.
In brief outline: responsiveness to practical reasons is also constitutive
of being a person, for without it there is no action with the intention of
doing it. While not all actions are performed for a reason, when we do
something with the intention of doing it, which is roughly when we have a
purpose in doing it, see a point in doing it, we act for a reason, that is we
act in the belief that there is a reason for the action. Such actions, which
I will somewhat inaccurately refer to as intentional actions, are governed
by reason somewhat less directly than beliefs. Both intentional action and
belief are subject to failures correctly to identify reasons, failures to follow
through with the implications of reasons one identified (as in failures
of memory or lapses of attention) as well as to irrationalities, including
motivated irrationalities. In both cases we recognise such failures for what
they are in principle, thus acknowledging that beliefs and intentional actions
are inherently governed by reason. There is, as we know, a keen debate
about the difference between the conditions for rationality of belief and of
intentional action, e.g. whether there is epistemic akrasia. For our purpose
suffice it to note that whatever differences there are they are secondary
to the basic point that we cannot, while acting intentionally, but act for
a (perceived) reason (albeit not always the one we believe to be the best
reason).²⁵ Rationality, namely responsiveness to reasons, is thus constitutive
of being persons.
The relationship of Reason and reasons has been the thread going through
this paper. Trying to understand what motivates one to search for, say, the
foundations of normativity, we realise that the search cannot even as much
as be stated from ‘inside’ as it were. From ‘inside’ we can only look for
reasons for reasons, or note that disregarding reasons is, under appropriate
circumstances, irrational, that is a symptom of the malfunctioning of our
²⁴ Compare my discussion of the matter in Engaging Reason, ch. 1 (Oxford: OUP, 1999).
²⁵ I have discussed challenges and exceptions to this view on various occasions, most
comprehensively in chapter 2 of Engaging Reason, and in ‘The Guise of the Good’, in
S. Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Good, and Practical Reason (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
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rational powers. All such internal investigations inevitably move in a circle,
and do not reach the puzzle.
So we went outside, and raised a question about reasons, stated in
non-normative terms: what is the hold reasons have on us? The answer
was that we cannot ignore them because we are persons, or more precisely,
because rational powers are constitutive of personhood, and because they
are powers whose use does not depend on our will. That is, these powers are
engaged and active willy nilly, independently of any decision to use them,
so long as we are awake and do not suppress them. They are like our hearing
rather than like our ability to speak. Hence, so long as we are persons we
engage with reasons, generally trying to do it well, however imperfect our
success.
Now, you may object that even if true these observations do not explain
normativity, let alone justify its standing. They say something about
rational powers, but nothing at all about reasons. I emphasised early on
that explaining why reasons call for a certain response need not invoke
our rational powers, which are merely powers to recognise and respond to
what is there independently of them—well, at least sometimes, given that
some reasons would not exist but for the powers and activities of rational
creatures.
In a way the objection is justified. Rejecting the feasibility of a reductive
explanation means that once we step outside, as it were, and examine
normativity as a whole we lose the ability to explain it. That explanation is
inevitably internal—reasons are what we should follow, disregarding them
is unjustified, etc. etc. But we can explain from outside the inescapability of
normativity, the hold reasons have on us. We do so, to be sure, by pointing
out features of rational powers, but rational powers are essentially powers to
recognise and respond to reasons. So in explaining their place in our life we
also point to the hold that reasons have on us, though that hold is subject
to mistakes and irrationalities.
Still, disquiet may persist: does any of this amount to more than saying
that we are boxed into treating certain considerations as if they were reasons?
Does it not fail to vindicate them as reasons? Are reasons normative in the
deeper sense that there is a point to being guided by them, that being guided
by them is not an arbitrary, albeit a natural response? Is our responsiveness
to reasons just a fact rather than a response to a normative consideration?
Is it not like saying that we are persons only so long as we breathe, a fact
which we must acknowledge, but can find arbitrary, and are free to resent?
I’ll say nothing about breathing. But reasons are different. Here, I think,
the fact that the account is confined to their formal characterisations is—far
from being a shortcoming—a key to its success. Reasons are governed by
maxims stating that a reason for belief is a fact which is part of a case for
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having that belief , and a reason for action is a fact which is part of the case
for performing that action. Such characterisations are relatively formal in
that they do not directly yield a way of establishing what is a reason for
what. But they focus discussion about what properties make for reasons:
such investigation may yield that beliefs, though not thoughts generally, are
without flaw if true, and actions done with intentions to do them, though
not actions generally, are without flaw if they are adequately valuable.
Hence reasons for beliefs are truth indicators, and reasons for action are
their value properties. Truth indicators are truth indicators even if there
are no rational creatures who can rely on them to form beliefs. Values,
those whose existence does not depend on the culture of rational creatures,
are values, and have instances whether or not there are persons able to
perceive and respond to them as values. Our rational capacities enable us
to recognise and respond to reason-constituting facts, and being reflective
powers they enable us to improve our understanding of what makes those
facts what they are, and how best to identify them for what they are.
Do all values derive from the well-being of some agent? Is there some
property which constitutes some facts as moral reasons, and so on? The
formal characterisations serve to focus and frame thought about which more
substantive properties constitute reasons, properties whose standing does
not depend on our rationality.
This, some will say, is a very surprising view to end up with. Does it
not mean that normativity resides in our rationality; that values, and truth
indicators, etc. are not normative in themselves? It depends on what you
mean by in themselves. Barometric pressure is evidence of weather which
we, using our rational capacities, have come to recognize and we form
beliefs on its basis. No doubt some other animal species, lacking rational
powers, respond ‘automatically’ to variations in barometric pressure. They
do not take it to be a reason for anything. They do not recognize its
normative aspect. But it has it. It has it in virtue of the ability of rational
creatures to recognize that it is evidence of forthcoming weather. Or think
of our dependence on food for survival. We forage for food using our
rational capacities. Some other animal species seek food independently of
any rational powers. It is no reason for them, but it is of value to them.
We depend for survival on our ability to adjust our pupils to light levels,
our ability to adjust our breathing and blood circulation to prevailing
conditions. We do so as other species react to barometric pressure: the
features are not reasons for us. But they are good for us. Does all this show
that value and evidence are not normative? At most it shows not that they
are not normative, but that what makes them normative is their ability to
function as reasons, that is to be recognised as such by creatures using their
rational powers.
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But, some will say, the question remains: assume that I am right
in emphasising (a) that subjection to the discipline of reasons is semiautomatic, (b) that it is normative in being an adjustment of our beliefs
and intentions in light of reasons, and (c) that the capacities manifested in
these adjustments are constitutive of being persons. But having conceded
that this is so only shows that a general rational capacity is constitutive
of personhood, and not that reasons or normativity are constitutive of
personhood: the three points fail to vindicate normativity. It is not enough
to point out that creatures with no rational capacities are not persons.
Clearly there is nothing amiss with pigeons, even though they do not (I
assume) have rational capacities. A vindication of normativity has to show
what is amiss with failing to conform to reason on this or that occasion.
At this point I have to admit that I no longer understand the sense of
puzzlement. What is amiss with failing to conform to reason is just that.
It can be specified further: it may be defrauding a person of his money,
or it may be wasting one’s talent, or missing an opportunity to make a lot
of money, or remaining confused about black holes. It all depends on the
nature of the reasons one flouted. But clearly that is not the puzzle. It has
something to do with vindicating reasons or normativity in general, without
assuming their cogency. So what is it? We do know that people who flout
reason sometimes prosper. Is the desire for some further vindication of
reasons a hope that philosophical argument can show this to be an illusion?
But there is no illusion there.

